Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Why are Asians, Especially South Korean Golfers Dominating The LPGA?

http://www.ibtimes.com/sportsnet/golf/why-asians-especially-south-koreans-dominating-lpga_1495.htm

Posted by Contributor: Helyn Edwards |             

Jiya Shin, ranked No. 10 in the world, captured her second career major shooting 71 and 73 in a 36-hole final Sunday at the 2012 Women's British Open at the Royal Liverpool Golf Club with a record-breaking 9-shot victory. Shin's victory at the Open meant that for the first time in the Ladies Professional Golf Association's (LPGA) history, all four major titles in one season are held by Asian-born players, 3 by South Koreans.

Shin joined Sun Young Yoo who captured the Kraft Nabisco Championship, Na Yeon Choi who won the U.S. Women's Open, and Shanshan Feng from mainland China who won the LPGA Championship. The rest of the leaderboard included Inbee Park as the runner-up and American Paula Creamer at 3rd, joined by two other Americans in the top ten, Stacy Lewis and Katie Fucher. The weather as usual in British Opens was the major issue putting a dampener on the players, especially Karrie Webb, the 72-hole leader.

The sweep by Asian players of the majors this year comes 14 years after Se Ri Pak of South Korea became a national hero by capturing two straight LPGA majors: the U.S. Women's Open and the LPGA Championship in 1998. 12 of the players on the LPGA's top 20 money list are Asians, including #1 Park ($1,419,940) of S. Korea.

Surely the United States Golf Association (USGA) and other Federations are trying to discover and duplicate the South Korean Golf Assoc. Although making strides, none have had the same dominance, with only 4 Americans in the top money list. As good as reporting is on all levels, if there was one thing or something tangible it would have been cloned and there would be parity among the nations.

One intangible that is helping is the Asian culture. South Korean television signs on every morning with the national anthem, accompanied by images to instill national pride, like the military, Pak and other successful athletes. Also children are in school, then an after-school program in education or in a sports activity until it's time to go to bed everyday, unlike Western culture with its freer, more rounded emphasis. Most Asian children are expected to help their family and their country succeed, and golf is the new path to success even to the exclusion of education.

Besides more opportunity, another advantage is a more open sponsorship where even low ranked pros are assisted with their bills for travel and training in contrast to the USA. Ask American Meg Mallon winner of the 2004 US Open who had no sponsors. Won-Seok Choi, a manager for Hi-Mart, Korea's Best Buy, sponsors several players on the LPGA Tour and dozens more in Korea. "We like to support many Korean women golfers because they have a chance to become a big player, like Se Ri Pak...Asian people have very strong families, and support is the most important thing."

At the U.S. Women's Open this weekend, 5 Korean players were still on the putting green as darkness fell. Shin remarked that, "We work hard...I think so many Asia players are playing at the moment on the LPGA Tour, so it makes a lot of chance to win." In tennis, long-time coaches believe that the more numbers exposed to the sport early on, especially to those athletes who have a hunger for the sport and penchant for success, will lead to more great champions. Unless the USGA invests more in First Tee and the USTA in NJTL or similar grass roots programs and minor levels of play, particularly in the larger segment of the population, then the South Koreans and other Asians, who have done so already, will continue to excel.

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Sunday, September 16, 2012

PSY - GANGNAM STYLE (강남스타일)


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Friday, July 20, 2012

Between Giants: South Korea and the U.S.-China Rivalry

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/between-giants-south-korea-and-the-us-china-rivalry/260060/

By Jennifer Lind

An American ally and a Chinese economic partner, South Korea is trying to hedge between two great powers as they compete for influence.

SK nationalists.jpg
South Korean conservatives protest the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong island in late 2010. (AP)

After a decade of preoccupation with the Middle East, the United States is turning its attention toward Asia. As Washington refocuses on managing a rising China, in part by strengthening its ties with a network of Asian countries, it's discovering that at least one of its principal allies in the region may not be as fully on board as hoped. While the United States was toppling dictators and chasing terrorists, its South Korean ally has grown accustomed to a powerful China, and appears ambivalent about its role in America's plans for Asia. That's not to say that South Korea is about to evict the tens of thousands of American troops who still help deter North Korean aggression. But nor is the country apparently eager to participate in what many South Koreans see as a U.S. effort to contain China, whose rise has so far benefited their country in many ways. South Korean views are after all shaped by history: not only by the Japanese occupation, World War Two, and Korean War, but by hundreds of years of living as a small country surrounded by giants.

Recent cooperation between Japan and South Korea, the United States' two key regional allies, suggested promise for a nascent coalition. In June, all three held joint military exercises and Seoul and Tokyo negotiated an accord to facilitate intelligence sharing on North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. This agreement, called the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), would enhance America's ability to work with its two allies and represented, as political scientist Jeffrey Hornung wrote in the Japan Times, a "practical, forward-looking effort to strengthen relations between two vibrant democracies facing shared security challenges." Or it would have, at least, if it had ever been signed.

When South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's government announced the accord with Japan, politicians and civic groups protested. The agreement had been negotiated too quickly and secretly, they decried, demanding that it come before the National Assembly. In the heat of South Korea's election-year politics, politicians railed against security cooperation with Japan and lambasted Lee's government for selling out their country to Tokyo." The idea of offering our military intelligence to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is utterly unreasonable," declared Democratic United Party spokesperson Kim Hyun in a statement, demanding an apology from President Lee. Two members of Lee's administration resigned, and opposition politicians have submitted a no-confidence vote calling for the prime minister's resignation. Lee's government shelved the accord.

Commentators largely blame the fracas on the lingering Japanese-South Korean tensions over historical and territorial disputes. Many Koreans resent Japan for not clearly acknowledging the atrocities it committed during its occupation of the Korean peninsula in the first half of the 20th century. Japanese leaders have at times issued apologies, but politicians and intellectuals on Japan's right still routinely deny well-established historical facts about the country's past human rights violations And Japan and South Korea both claim the same string of tiny islands -- known as Tokdo to Koreans, Takeshima to Japanese, and trouble to everyone else -- which have become a nationalist minefield for the two countries to traverse.

Still, there's something more behind the unraveling of the GSOMIA accord -- South Korean ambivalence about the country's role in the unfolding U.S.-China drama. Several defense and foreign policy analysts in Seoul told me, when I visited recently, that many of their countrymen shied away from GSOMIA because they saw it as part of a U.S.-led security architecture positioned against China. They added that many South Koreans are dismayed that, as they perceive it, the U.S. increasingly sees China as a military threat. A professor at the Korea National Defense University named Lee Byeong-Gu told me, "In particular, signing the GSOMIA agreement is worrying to Koreans in light of the recent U.S. 'pivot' or 'rebalancing' toward Asia, which many people fear represents an increased containment effort toward China. Some South Koreans are calling for their government to sign an intelligence-sharing agreement with Beijing as well as with Tokyo. South Korean legislator Shim Yoon-joe commented that signing such a pact with both Japan and China is important in order "to wipe out the allegation that the Korea-Japan military pact is a stepping stone to trilateral cooperation to check China."

South Korean analysts also emphasized to me that China is their country's top trading partner. As Aidan Foster-Carter put it, "South Korea can hardly afford to be seen as ganging up on the country whose growth largely drives its own." This year marks the tenth anniversary of the normalization of relations between South Korea and China. One researcher at a think tank in Seoul remarked to me that his institute has planned conferences and other events to commemorate the anniversary, and that South Korea's many other foreign policy institutes are all doing the same. At a time when the Americans appear to be orchestrating a coalition to balance against China, South Koreans are celebrating with it a milestone in productive and friendly relations.

Yet South Koreans are as wary of accommodating China as they are of containing it. Seoul resents Beijing's support for the North Korean regime. If North Koreans continue to kill South Koreans (as they did in 2010 in the attacks against the Cheonan frigate and Yongpyeong Island), Seoul may grow less tolerant of Beijing's sheltering of Pyongyang. Or increased Chinese belligerence in the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes may lead Seoul to decide that it needs allies to protect it from the behemoth in its backyard.

It's possible that Chinese policies could one day lead South Korea to edge closer to the U.S. and Japan, but that day has not yet come, and China may never even emerge as a security threat that requires the sort of balancing coalition that the U.S. seems to envision. As long as this ambiguity continues -- or as long as Washington tolerates its ally's coziness with Beijing -- South Korea's strategic position will likely push it strongly toward hedging. As such, Seoul will resist policies, like the agreement with Japan, that appear to situate it clearly on the side of one great power or another. ◦
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Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Matthews Asia report: The Ascent of South Korea

http://us.matthewsasia.com/perspectives-on-asia/asia-insight/default.fs

"Korea has been one of the few nations to consistently increase R&D spending in recent years while many other countries have cut back."


The Ascent of South Korea

July 2012
One country in Asia that seems to attract less attention than it might deserve, considering its modern-day achievements, is South Korea.

While index provider MSCI this year (once again) left South Korea classified as an “emerging market,” both FTSE and Standard & Poor’s have placed Korea in the “developed market” camp for several years now. In June, South Korea became the seventh nation in the world to become a member of the so-called “20-50 club”—a moniker referring to countries each having a population size over 50 million and national incomes exceeding US$20,000. Other nations in the club are the U.S., Japan, France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the U.K. having joined most recently in 1996. But what makes Korea even more impressive is just how far it has risen in a relatively short span of time. In 1960, the year following the end of the Korean War, the nation was among the poorest in the world, and its GDP per capita was comparable to some of the most impoverished areas of Africa. This economic progress has come in combination with Korea’s democratic trajectory. Now among Asia’s most democratic countries—on par with Japan—Korea’s political system includes leftists and progressives within a broad ideological spectrum. What has propelled Korea to this status? Let us examine the forces we believe to be shaping its future as well as the challenges that lie ahead.


 Emphasis on Education and R&D

Among Korea’s chief attributes is its strong emphasis on education. Korean parents are known for the importance they stress on education. In fact, Korea’s private sector spending on education is the highest among Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) member countries. Even today, small town communities hold celebrations for local students who are admitted into prestigious universities. The achievement is considered an honor for the entire town, and educational pedigree is generally considered a greater status symbol in Korea than monetary wealth. There are more than 75,000 foreign students from Korea currently studying in U.S. universities—a high ratio considering Korea’s university age population. Many of the students also tend to rejoin Korea’s workforce, benefiting Korea’s transformation from an industrial nation to a more research and development-focused economy.

In 2010, Korea showed the third-highest ratio of research and development (R&D) spending to GDP among OECD countries, and outpaced both the U.S. and Japan in this area. In fact, Korea has been one of the few nations to consistently increase R&D spending in recent years while many other countries have cut back. Even amid the recent global financial crisis, Korea increased its R&D spending. Accordingly, product quality among Korean auto and electronics makers has noticeably been on the rise.



Globally Competitive Companies

In many product categories—from semiconductors to shipbuilding—Korea now boasts a dominant market share. Its auto industry has also been making impressive and steady gains that have resulted not only from competitive pricing but also from improved brand image and product quality. This year, despite offering fewer incentives than the industry average in the U.S., Korean auto companies still continued to gain market share. One Korean automaker was also ranked highest among all automakers in the U.S., according to a recent consumer survey and has been honored with several automotive accolades in the past few years. Not bad for a company that didn’t start making its own branded cars until 1975—about seven decades after Ford introduced the Model-T and about 40 years after Toyota’s first car. Considering Korea’s recent free trade agreement with the U.S., Korean companies should be able to increasingly tap into the large U.S. consumer market.

The Road Ahead

Korea’s strides in branding and R&D, coupled with a well-educated and Internet-savvy workforce (it now has one of the highest penetration rates of broadband and smartphone users), no doubt have helped to maintain its low unemployment rate, which was 3.2% in May. After Korea was hit, like many other countries, by the recent global financial crisis, it demonstrated notable resilience with its quick recovery.

Still, Korea’s growth is not without hurdles. Concerns include its quickly aging population and a birth rate that has been on the decline since the 1970s. Government officials have been trying to reverse this trend with measures to increase the participation of women in the workforce, create easier access to childcare, better work and social benefits and more affordable education. Another measure taken to address labor shortage issues was the reform of its foreign worker policy. The government introduced an Employment Permit System (EPS) in 2004 to manage foreign workers in a more systematic way while also improving the basic rights of foreign workers. Between 2006 and 2010, Korea had a net influx of 283,000 foreign workers. Fortunately, Korea’s growth in labor productivity has been one of the fastest among OECD members, allowing it to produce more goods and services with the same levels of labor.

It is difficult to explore Korea’s economic ascent without a discussion over its system of chaebols—large, often family-controlled conglomerates. Korean chaebol companies represent both the economy’s successes and challenges. On one hand, concentrating domestic economic power within a few chaebols has enabled Korea to compete internationally, driving growth as most chaebols have done exceptionally well in overseas markets. However, this concentration of power can also leave Korea vulnerable. The fall of one chaebol company could have significant and wide-reaching social, political and economic consequences. For example, the infamous collapse of one conglomerate in 1999, in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, forced a wave of closures and impacted jobs in several countries.

Many argue that Korea needs to cultivate a stronger small and medium-enterprise (SME) sector to better weather economic downturns. Fortunately, there are encouraging signs as we see an increasing number of smaller firms making inroads in areas such as consumer-related industries, particularly in China. In addition, Korea has seen its so-called “soft goods”—Internet services, pop music and television dramas—enjoy new popularity. These industries are primarily led by entrepreneurs, rather than chaebol-related firms.

Relationship with North Korea

Another long-term challenge continues to be South Korea’s relationship with its Stalinist neighbor to the North. Since the Korean War ended in an armistice in 1953, North Korea has continued to threaten South Korea with periodic military provocations that have included artillery fire attacks. Each incident has led to short-term market volatility and we expect this to continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. North Korea is still undergoing a leadership transition since long-time leader Kim Jong Il died in 2011. His son, Kim Jong Un, is expected to lead the country; for the time being, little is known about him and North Korea remains a closed economy.

Should North Korea change it stance, however, there are great potential benefits to the Korean peninsula. On a basic level, North Korea could become a good source of the labor and natural resources that South Korea lacks. In turn, South Korea—could provide the technology and capital to help North Korea develop.

More to Come

Korea tends to be viewed with the same lens that investors use to consider Asia’s two largest economies—China and India. But that may be the wrong comparison. China and India are still considered emerging countries while Korea has already gained developed country status. When compared to other developed nations, Korea’s growth profile stands out. Among developed nations, Korea had the third-highest GDP growth rate in 2011, trailing Israel and Sweden. In 2012, based on the OECD’s forecast, Korea is expected to be the fastest-growing developed country. Despite its growth over the past few decades, however, Korea’s GDP per capita is still just about half that of Japan, indicating room for further expansion.

Not only is Korea’s growth rate positive, it is also now more transparent. Last year, Korea became one of the first countries in the region to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards, which require companies with assets of more than 2 trillion won (US$1.7 billion) to make financial statements easier and more transparent for foreign investors to access. SMEs are expected to be required to adopt these standards by next year. Since the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, Korea has also undergone significant corporate governance reforms. The introduction of outside directors is a major feature of the changes to board regulations, and enhances a board’s monitoring functions. Holding companies have simplified their shareholding structures and other measures have increased management accountability, protecting minority shareholder rights and information disclosure.



What I find most encouraging about Korea is its legacy of resiliency. If Korea can continue on a path of innovation and transparency, it should be able reach the next GDP milestone of US$30,000 GDP per capita. It took Japan five years to reach that target after joining the “20-50 club” and nine years for the U.S. Only time will tell when Korea will surpass such targets, and we will continue to keep a close watch.

Michael Oh, CFA
Portfolio Manager
Matthews International Capital Management, LLC ◦
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Saturday, February 25, 2012

Corporate governance explains South Korea’s low stockmarket ratings



http://www.economist.com/node/21547255

IT IS sometimes asserted that low South Korean equity valuations stem from the threat of instability in North Korea. That explanation looked a lot less convincing after the death of Kim Jong Il in December, when the KOSPI 200 index of leading shares and the won, the South Korean currency, both quickly shrugged off the news.

So what is the source of the “Korea discount”, which means that the KOSPI has a forward price-to-earnings ratio of under ten, below most other Asian stockmarkets (see chart)? There are a few possibilities. The national economic model is still built on exports, often in highly cyclical industries such as shipbuilding. The capital structure of South Korean firms has historically been debt-heavy.

But the prime cause of the discount is more likely to be poor corporate governance at the family-run chaebol conglomerates that dominate the economy. Nefarious schemes to pass on control to sons, avoid taxes and exploit company assets for the benefit of family members are widely discussed in private. They are also lambasted abroad: a 2010 survey by CLSA, a broker, placed the country third-from-bottom in Asia on governance, ahead of only Indonesia and the Philippines.

The issue is now also getting more of an airing at home. A recent report by Tongyang Securities, a broker, drew an explicit link between Korea’s low equity valuations and the practices of “tunnelling” and “propping”, which benefit insiders at the expense of smaller investors.

Tunnelling is the awarding of contracts to firms owned by family members. Chaebol heads typically own only a small portion of their firms, but are able to maintain control through complex cross-holdings; tunnelling offers a means of exploiting that control to get richer, quicker. In 2007, for instance, the Fair Trade Commission, an official watchdog, fined Hyundai Motor for, among other things, giving 1.3 trillion won ($1.4 billion) of business to Glovis, a firm owned by the son of Hyundai’s chairman—without any tendering.

Propping is similar to tunnelling, and means that unviable units get financial support from sister companies. But it is no less damaging to small investors. If company insiders are able to misuse shareholders’ funds at will, would-be investors will reduce their expectations of future cash flows and thus attach lower valuations to stocks.

Other allegations are even more serious. On February 3rd Hanwha Group announced in a regulatory filing that its chairman, Kim Seung-yeon, was among several officials being investigated for alleged embezzlement. Chey Tae-won, the chairman of SK Group, was indicted in January over the disappearance of 99 billion won from company coffers, as part of a scheme allegedly planned by his brother to cover futures-trading losses. Mr Chey denies the charges. The Federation of Korean Industries, a chaebol pressure group, has urged prosecutors to go easy on Mr Chey. They say that punishing him would harm “entrepreneurial spirit”.

Mr Chey has had previous scrapes, having been convicted of a billion-dollar accounting fraud in 2003. He eventually received a full pardon from the president and was also chosen to represent the nation during the 2010 G20 summit, leading a meeting of international chief executives. Lee Kun-hee, the chairman of Samsung, received a similar pardon in 2009, having been found guilty of tax evasion, and was picked to front South Korea’s bid for the 2018 Winter Olympics. Yujeon mujwai, mujeon yujwai—an old expression meaning “money = innocence, no money = guilt”—is enjoying a resurgence in popularity.

The irony is that the largest chaebol are models of efficient production and are enjoying a golden period. Their success, say proponents, vindicates the family-run approach to business. Their ownership structure means they have no need to appease short-termist investors or to meet quarterly earnings targets; instead, they can invest for the long run. Smaller shareholders have reason to feel less thrilled. ◦
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Mobile phones in North Korea



http://www.economist.com/node/21547295

Some North Koreans get better connected

A NORTH KOREAN professor apparently posted footage on YouTube last year boasting that his country was developing applications for the Android mobile-phone operating system. Ordinary North Koreans are more likely to be pining for a humble mobile phone of any sort, and now their chances of owning one are increasing. Smuggled mobiles have been used on Chinese networks near the border for years, but now business is booming for Koryolink, the North’s only official cellular network, based in the capital, Pyongyang.

The service—75%-owned by Orascom, an Egyptian firm, and 25%-owned by the North Korean state—has gone from 300,000 to 1m subscribers in 18 months. For a hermit kingdom whose rulers resent their subjects keeping closely in touch with each other, this is a remarkable development.

Koryolink earns a gross margin of 80%, making North Korea by far the most profitable market in which Orascom operates. The company has worked hard to court the regime, its chairman travelling to Pyongyang last year to meet the late supreme leader, Kim Jong Il.

North Korean mobile-phone users spend an average of $13.90 a month on calls and text messages, and they tend to pay in hard currency. According to a foreign diplomat, many customers turn up at Koryolink shops with bundles of euro notes. There are even incentives for paying in euros, such as free off-peak calls. This provides foreign currency for a government that craves it.

Mobile-phone customers obtain the hard currency from the informal private trading on which many North Koreans depend. Such business is forbidden, but the government has failed to feed its people, forcing it to turn a blind eye to some capitalist practices. Many insiders benefit: Pyongyang’s “golden couples” consist of a government-official husband and an entrepreneur wife.

Mobile usage now appears to be spreading beyond Pyongyang. The gadgets are a common sight in other cities such as Nampo, not far from the capital, and increasingly are owned by non-officials. As yet, though, only a sixth of the country has a mobile signal.

The authorities are not naive. Some outside observers believe that North Korea’s first experiment with mobile telephony came to a sudden end in 2004 because a mobile phone was used to detonate a huge bomb at a train station that nearly killed Kim Jong Il.

Koryolink is a walled garden: users are not able to make or receive international calls, and there is no internet access. It would be hard to imagine that calls and text messages are not monitored. As in China, the network is even becoming a means by which the state disseminates propaganda. Rodong Shinmun, the government mouthpiece, sends out text messages that relay the latest news to phone subscribers.

Orascom’s slogan is “Giving the world a voice”. For Koryolink’s users, that may literally be true, as North Korean mobile-phone users enjoy some of the benefits of modernity that other countries take for granted. Their phones are not yet the tools of revolution, but mark an amazing change for all that. ◦
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Let them eat cake: A half-baked effort to curb the conglomerates



http://www.economist.com/node/21546069

SOME parents give their children cakes. A few give them cake shops. The hot topic in South Korea is the trend for daughters and grand-daughters of chaebol families to open bakeries and other small food outlets. The chaebol are the conglomerates that dominate the Korean economy, so these plutocratic pâtissières have deeper pockets than any of the little bakers they compete against.

Their baking has provoked outrage. Lee Myung-bak, South Korea’s president, calls it a “hobby” business for rich girls that threatens the livelihood of poor shopkeepers. Lee Ju-young, a member of the national assembly, likens it to Park Ji-sung (Manchester United’s Korean midfielder) lording it over amateurs in a backstreet game of football. A restaurateur in Seoul puts it more plaintively: “These families already control everything else in Korea. Why can’t they leave something for the rest of us?”

The chaebol families have decided that this is not a battle worth picking. Scions of the Samsung, LG and Hyundai dynasties are all hanging up their aprons. Artisée, a chain of swanky pastry shops run by Lee Boo-jin, whose dad is the chairman of Samsung, is to close. So is the Hyundai-affiliated Ozen.

Whether this will help small bakers much is open to question. Artisée has only 27 shops; Ozen a mere two. Both are cupcakes in comparison to SPC Group, which operates more than 3,000 Paris Baguette shops in Korea. Buns have always been SPC’s bread and butter—and its boss is not an heiress.

Some say all this pie-throwing distracts attention from the real problems that overmighty chaebol cause. Entrepreneurs complain that if they have a good idea, the chaebol show up with their chequebooks and poach their staff. Small firms that supply chaebol complain that they are ruthlessly squeezed, though few dare say so publicly.

Consumers also suffer. Korea’s Fair Trade Commission (FTC) detected over 3,500 cases of price-fixing in 2010, but only 66 led to fines. The average penalty amounted to just 2.3% of unfairly earned revenue. Samsung and LG were fined in January for fixing the prices of notebook PCs and flat-screen televisions between June 2008 and September 2009. Samsung was ordered to pay a fine of 25.8 billion won ($23m); LG, 18.8 billion won. LG’s fine is to be waived, in return for co-operation with the FTC. This is the third time the two firms have been caught price-fixing in the past two years.

Politicians follow the same old recipes when dealing with the chaebol. They lean on banks to lend cash to small firms. And they lean on the chaebol to stay out of a few minor businesses, such as baking or tofu-making. However you sugarcoat it, this is not serious reform. ◦
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Sunday, December 04, 2011

The Returnees - South Korea's U.S. Educated Entrepreneurs



Seoul is home to a burgeoning corps of young entrepreneurs, a shocking number of them born or educated in America. Why aren't they starting companies here?
By Max Chafkin | Nov 30, 2011
Two years ago, Daniel Shin quit his job and started a company.

The act was, by almost any standard, a laudable one, coming as it did in the middle of the worst recession in decades and given that Shin had been enjoying the kind of upper-middle-class life that, once tasted, can be difficult to give up. Born in South Korea, Shin moved to suburban Washington, D.C., with his parents when he was 9. He went to a magnet high school and got into the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, where he studied finance and marketing. By 2008, he was comfortably ensconced in the New Jersey offices of McKinsey & Company, where recession-era cutbacks meant that all-expenses-paid Caribbean bacchanals had given way to comparatively ascetic (but still all expenses paid) ski trips. He had an apartment in Manhattan. He was comfortable. His parents were proud.

And yet somehow, this life, in all its dull glory, did not feel like his own. Shin was an entrepreneur at heart, having started two companies while still in college. The first, a website for students looking for housing, failed miserably. The second, an Internet advertising company called Invite Media, which he co-founded with several classmates during his senior year, was more promising. It won a business-plan competition in early 2007 and raised $1 million in venture capital the next year.

Shin's buddies would eventually sell Invite Media to Google for $81 million, but Shin had left the company long before that happened. His parents, who had come all the way from Korea precisely so their son could grow up to work at a place like McKinsey, were not about to see Daniel throw the opportunity away for a money-losing start-up no one had ever heard of. "That was the only reason I was at McKinsey," says Shin. "It didn't feel like a career to me. I'd always wanted to start a business."

By late 2009, Shin was through with consulting, but he didn't have the guts to strike out on his own just yet. He applied for, and was offered, a job in the New York City office of Apax Partners, a European private equity firm. He accepted the offer on the condition that he could delay his start date until the following August, so he could complete the two-year stint he had promised McKinsey. It was a lie; he walked out on McKinsey in November. "It was my chance to get something off the ground without my parents telling me I couldn't do it," says Shin. "I had about six months."

Shin got to work. He and two college buddies holed up in a house with whiteboards, laptops, and an endless supply of McDonald's for a series of all-day brainstorming sessions. Their goal: to come up with a business that would grow fast and require no start-up capital. They started with 20 ideas and, over the course of two months, whittled them down to one: a Groupon-style coupon company that would offer deals on restaurants, events, and merchandise. Shin liked the business model because it had a built-in financing strategy: Cash came in several months before the company would have to pay it out, giving him a supply of free debt. He picked a name—Ticket Monster—collected several thousand e-mail addresses, and launched the site in May.

A month later, Apax called Shin to rescind its offer of employment. The firm had done a background check and discovered that Daniel Shin was not a second-year McKinsey associate but the CEO of a fast-growing company that was doing $1 million a month in revenue. By the end of the summer, Ticket Monster had doubled in size, growing to 60 employees. By the end of the year, the company had doubled in size again.

When I met Shin last August, just 20 months after he quit McKinsey, he had 700 employees and roughly $25 million a month in revenue. "We've always been afraid that we wouldn't grow fast enough," said Shin, a baby-faced 26-year-old with a booming voice and a hulking frame. A year ago, he was one of only two salespeople at the company; today, he is sitting in a brand-new corner office acting like the CEO. "We didn't believe in spending money in the early days," Shin said. "We had this whole macho idea about starting up." A week after he said this, Shin sold his company to the social-commerce site LivingSocial for a price that was reported to be $380 million.

An immigrant starts a business, creates hundreds of jobs, and becomes wealthy beyond his wildest dreams—all in a matter of months. It's the kind of only-in-America story that makes us shake our heads in wonder, even pride. At a time of 9 percent unemployment, it's also the sort of story we Americans desperately need to hear more of.

But Daniel Shin isn't that kind of immigrant. He went in the opposite direction. Ticket Monster is based in Seoul, South Korea. Shin arrived there in January 2010 with a vague plan to start a company; the brainstorming sessions that produced Ticket Monster took place in his grandmother's house in Seoul. Now he is the closest thing there is to a Korean Mark Zuckerberg, despite the fact that upon his arrival, he barely spoke Korean.

Last December, Shin was summoned to South Korea's version of the White House—the Blue House—for a meeting with the country's president, a former Hyundai executive named Lee Myung-bak. In attendance were the CEOs of many of the country's largest companies—LG, Samsung, SK, and half a dozen others. "It was the conglomerates and me," says Shin. "They were saying, 'We have X billion in revenue, and we're in X number of countries.' I'm like, 'We didn't exist a few months ago.'" Shin laughs—a sheepish, nervous laugh—as he tells me this story and shakes his head. It's been a crazy year and a half. "I think it was the first time the president had learned an entrepreneur's name," he says. A few weeks later, President Lee gave a radio address in which he sang Shin's praises and urged the youth of South Korea to follow his example. (In Korean, family names come before given names. Throughout the rest of this story, I've used the Western convention, as do most Korean business people.)

At the end of last summer, I traveled to Seoul, an ultra-modern city of 25 million, because I wanted to know how a twentysomething kid with limited money and limited language skills could become this country's great economic hope. I wanted to know what in the world was going on in Seoul—and also, what in the world was going on inside the head of Daniel Shin of Wharton and McKinsey and McLean, Virginia. Why would a guy who could have just as easily written his own ticket in the U.S. decide to do so on the other side of the world?

The first thing I learned was that Shin was not alone—he wasn't even the only young, ambitious American in the coupon business. His chief competitor, Coupang, was founded by a 33-year-old Korean American serial entrepreneur named Bom Kim, who last year dropped out of Harvard Business School and relocated to Seoul to start his company. After a little more than a year in business, Coupang has 650 employees and $30 million from U.S. investors. Kim hopes to take the company public on the Nasdaq by 2013. "There's an opportunity here," says Kim. "I want this to be a company like PayPal or eBay."

Kim was one of more than a dozen American entrepreneurs I met in Seoul. They were the founders of media start-ups, video-game start-ups, financial-services start-ups, manufacturing start-ups, education start-ups, and even a start-up dedicated to producing more start-ups. "It's a big trend here," says Henry Chung, managing director of DFJ Athena, a venture capital firm with offices in Seoul and Silicon Valley. "There's a growing number of students studying overseas and coming back."

The country to which they are returning is an entirely different place from the one they (or their parents) left years ago. In 1961, the southern half of the Korean peninsula—formally known as the Republic of Korea—was one of the poorest places on earth. South Korea has no mineral resources to speak of, and it ranks 117th in the world in terms of arable land per capita, behind Saudi Arabia and Somalia. Fifty years ago, the average South Korean lived about as well as the average Bangladeshi. Today, South Koreans live about as well as Europeans. The country boasts the world's 12th-largest economy by purchasing power, an unemployment rate of just 3.2 percent, and one of the world's lowest rates of public debt. South Korea's per-capita GDP growth over the past half a century—23,000 percent—beats that of China, India, and every other country in the world. "A lot of Koreans still say that the market is too small," says Shin. "But it's not. It's huge."

South Korea is smaller in area than Iceland but has 166 times its population, meaning that 80 percent of its 49 million citizens live in urban areas. In the capital, retail shops and businesses reach high into the air and far below the earth in miles of underground shopping malls. Many of Seoul's bars and nightclubs stay open until sunup, but just walking the city's narrow, hilly streets—jostled by hawkers and flanked by the neon signs that advertise barbecue joints and karaoke rooms and the ubiquitous "love motels"—can be intoxicating all by itself. An hour's drive west, in Incheon, 50- and 60-story apartment buildings abut rice paddies and vegetable gardens.

The sense of claustrophobic density is magnified by the country's embrace of communications technologies. In the 1990s, the South Korean government invested heavily in the installation of fiber-optic cables, with the result that by 2000, Koreans were four times as likely as Americans to have high-speed Internet access. Koreans still enjoy the fastest Internet in the world while paying some of the lowest prices. The easiest way to feel like an outsider in this country is to board one of Seoul's subway cars, which are equipped with high-speed cellular Internet, Wi-Fi, and digital TV service, and look anywhere but at the screen in your hand.

Have you ever heard the term Pali pali?" asks Brian Park, the 32-year-old CEO of X-Mon Games, which makes games for mobile devices. The phrase—often said quickly and at considerable volume—can be heard all over Seoul; it translates roughly to "Hurry, hurry." Park, who founded his company in early 2011 with $40,000 in seed capital from Ticket Monster's Shin and another $40,000 from the South Korean government, invokes the phrase in trying to explain the three beds I had noticed in his company's conference room.

"It's normal," he says, gesturing at the makeshift bunkhouse. "Our crazy culture." By that, he doesn't mean the culture of the seven-person company. He means the culture of the entire country of South Korea, where the average worker spent 42 hours a week on the job in 2010, the highest in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (The average American worked 34 hours; the average German, 26.) I saw similar sleeping arrangements at most of the start-ups I visited, and even at some larger companies. The CEO of a 40-person tech company told me he lived in his office for more than a year, sleeping on a small foldup futon next to his desk. He had recently rented an apartment because his investors had become concerned about his health.

In their personal lives, South Koreans are relentless self-improvers, spending more on private education—English lessons and cram schools for college entrance exams—than do the citizens of any other developed country. Another obsession: cosmetic surgery, which is more common in South Korea than anywhere else in the world.

And yet despite this outward show of dynamism, South Korea remains in its soul a deeply conservative place. Shin told me about meeting, in Ticket Monster's early days, with an executive from a large Korean conglomerate about a marketing deal. The executive refused to talk business. He wanted to know why a young man with a wealthy family and an Ivy League diploma was messing around with start-ups. "He said that if his kid did what I'm doing, he'd disown him," Shin recalled. If this sounds like hyperbole, it's not: Jiho Kang, who is chief technology officer of a start-up in California and CEO of another one in Seoul, says that when he started a company after high school, his father, a college professor, kicked him out of the house. "My dad is seriously conservative, seriously Korean," Kang says.

That older Koreans view risk taking with suspicion isn't surprising, given the country's history. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 nearly destroyed the South Korean economic miracle. (In a remarkable show of national resilience, South Koreans turned in hundreds of pounds of gold—wedding bands, good-luck charms, heirlooms—to help their government pay down its debt.) These days, Seoul, which is just 30 miles from the North Korean border, remains on alert for a nuclear or chemical attack. One afternoon when I was in Seoul, the city stood still for 15 minutes as sirens blasted and police cleared the roadways. These drills, which are held several times a year, can be even more involved. Last December, a dozen South Korean fighter jets buzzed the city streets to simulate a North Korean air raid.

Amid all this instability, the Chaebol, Korea's family-owned conglomerates, have been a redoubt of stability, providing the best jobs, training new generations of leaders, and turning the country into the export powerhouse it is today. The Chaebol grew thanks to government policies, instituted in the 1960s, that gave them monopoly status in every major industry. Their power was greatly diminished in the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, but the Chaebol still dominate the economy. The 2010 sales of South Korea's largest Chaebol, the Samsung Group, were nearly $200 billion, or about one-fifth of the country's GDP.

To many South Koreans, being an entrepreneur—that is to say, going against the system that made the country rich—is seen as rebellious or even deviant. "Let's say you're working at Samsung and one day you say, 'This isn't for me' and start a company," says Won-ki Lim, a reporter for the Korea Economic Daily. "I don't know how Americans think about that, but in Korea, a lot of people will think you of you as a traitor." Business loans generally require personal guarantees, and bankruptcy usually disqualifies former entrepreneurs from good jobs. "People who fail leave this country," Lim says. "Or they leave their industry and start something different. They open a bakery or a coffee shop."

The penalty for failure is even more onerous for female entrepreneurs. When Ji Young Park founded her first company, in 1998, her bank not only required her to personally guarantee the company's loans—a typical request for a male founder—it also demanded guarantees from her husband, her parents, and her husband's parents. Park persevered—her current business, Com2uS, is a $25 million developer of cell-phone games—but her case is extremely rare. According to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, South Korea has fewer female entrepreneurs, on a per-capita basis, than Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Pakistan. "Most of the companies women are creating are really small, and the survival rates are really low," says Hyunsuk Lee, a professor at Seoul National University of Science and Technology.

Entrepreneurs in South Korea often struggle to raise capital. Though Korean venture capitalists invest several billion dollars a year—about half of which comes from government coffers—most of the money goes to well-established, profitable companies rather than true start-ups. It's not that Korean VCs hate small companies; it's just hard to make money selling them. "The Chaebol don't buy companies," says Chester Roh, a serial entrepreneur and angel investor who has taken one company public and sold one to Google. "They don't need to. They just call you up and say, 'We'll give you a good job.'"

As an American, Daniel Shin wasn't subject to these constraints. His largest institutional investor was Insight Venture Partners in New York City, where his college roommate worked as an associate. "American Koreans have a big competitive advantage," says Ji Young Park. "They can raise much larger investments from outside of Korea, and they can take business models from the U.S. It is much harder for a genuine Korean." This has a cultural component as well: "Korean Americans aren't predisposed to the Korean mindset," says Richard Min, co-founder and CEO of Seoul Space. "They're open to risk."

Min, a 38-year-old Korean American, is a former college swimmer who looks as if he could still do a couple of laps. He dresses well and talks fast, with just a hint of an accent from his native New England. He launched Seoul Space last year with two other Americans as a redoubt of Silicon Valley–style entrepreneurship in Seoul. The company offers discounted office space to start-ups, mentors them, and then introduces them to investors, in exchange for small equity stakes. "We're trying to get an ecosystem going here," Min says, leading me through a sea of mismatched office furniture at which 20 or so young people are pecking away at keyboards.

Min moved to South Korea in 2001 because he was curious about his roots and because he saw an opportunity in his dual identity. His first Korean company, Zingu, was the country's first pay-per-click advertising company. When the dot-com bust hit Seoul, he turned Zingu into a consulting firm to help large Korean companies market themselves outside the country. Two years ago, when the Korean launch of Apple's iPhone gave local software developers an easy route to international consumers, he decided that the next big opportunity was in start-ups. "You have a new generation feeling like they have a pathway that's not working for Samsung," says Min, who is winding down his ad agency in order to focus on Seoul Space. "We're at the forefront of a major shift."

I had assumed that everyone working in Seoul Space was Korean, but when Min started introducing me, I realized that half of these guys were American—there was Victor from Hawaii, Peter from Chicago, Mike from Virginia. Others were Korean nationals but with a decidedly American way of looking at the world. "I was a pure engineer—one of those nerds," says Richard Choi, who came to the United States in 2002, as a freshman biomedical engineering student at Johns Hopkins. "I had no interest in business whatsoever."

Choi assumed he would end up in the laboratory of some large company, but when he and several classmates designed a gadget that made it easier for medical technicians to take blood, he found himself in a business-plan competition. His team won first place—a whopping $5,000 prize—and he was hooked. Choi thought about starting a company after graduation, but he had a problem: His student visa had expired. He didn't have the $1 million in cash necessary to qualify for an investor visa, so he figured his only option would be to get a job and hope that his employer would sponsor his application for permanent residence. He went on a dozen interviews at American medical-device companies, but none were interested, and he finally enrolled in a master's program at Cornell to stay for another year. When it was over, he gave up on the States, returned to Korea, and took a job at the pharmaceutical division of SK, one of the country's largest conglomerates.

Choi worked at SK for three years, but he never got the entrepreneurial bug out of his system. Out of boredom, he started an event marketing company called Nodus, and then he met Min at a party. Min introduced him to the person with whom he would eventually (with one other person) co-found his current company, Spoqa, which makes a smartphone app designed to replace the loyalty cards issued by retail businesses. "It's funny how a small event can change your life," Choi says.

Over the past two years, the South Korean government has launched a series of policies designed to help people like Choi. The Small and Medium Business Administration—South Korea's version of the SBA—has created hundreds of incubators throughout the country, offering entrepreneurs free office space, thousands of dollars in grants, and guaranteed loans. There are government-sponsored missions to the United States and regular seminars for aspiring entrepreneurs. "Our economy can no longer rely only on the conglomerates," says Jangwoo Lee, a member of the Presidential Council for Future and Vision and a professor at Kyungpook National University in Seoul. "This is the 21st century. We need another instrument for economic growth."

That instrument, Lee told me, will be people like Shin. "He's part of a new trend in Korea," says Lee. "He made his success with his ideas and imagination, without a lot of technology and investment." Lee tells me that although South Korea has been very good at commercializing university research, it has been very bad at nurturing the kinds of disruptive companies that are so common in the U.S. "We need to get our young guys dreaming," he says.

That, says Min, is the idea of Seoul Space. "We're focusing on helping people understand how things work in Silicon Valley," he says. I got a taste of this on a Saturday morning at Seoul Space, as I watched half a dozen new entrepreneurs—some Korean and some American—present their ideas to an audience of 100 in the room and, via Skype, to several thousand viewers around the world as part of a Web TV show called This Week in Startups. The language of the day was, of course, English, and Min, who had spent hours coaching the six entrepreneurs on their pitches, leaned against a wall just off camera, watching nervously as his students performed.

Among the presenters was the incubator's biggest star, Jaehong Kim, a slight 26-year-old who wore an untucked white dress shirt and black trousers that stopped 8 inches above a pair of two-tone dress shoes. Kim is a co-founder of AdbyMe, an online advertising company that allows companies in South Korea and Japan to pay the users of social media to hawk their products. In his first four months, Kim turned a profit while taking in an impressive $250,000 in revenue.

AdbyMe graduated from Seoul Space earlier this year, moving its 10 employees into a small apartment across town. When I stop by on a Monday, Kim tells me to take off my shoes, walks me past the inevitable bedroom—"I sleep two nights a week here," he says with a grin—and then introduces me to a group of guys he calls Ringo, Big I, and AI. "His name isn't really AI," Kim explains. "We call each other by code names."

At most South Korean companies—even many start-ups—employees are addressed by their job title rather than their first name, but Kim is trying something new. At the suggestion of one of his co-founders, an engineer who lived in New Orleans as a child, Kim ordered employees to scrap the titular system and pick new names. If they want to get his attention, they refer to him not by the traditional Korean greeting—"Mr. CEO"—but by his nickname, Josh. "The vision is that an intern can tell me something isn't right," he says. I had assumed that Kim had been educated in the U.S., but it turned out he wasn't straight out of Wharton. He lived for two years in Kansas City, Kansas, but his most recent job had been as a first lieutenant in the Korean Army.

In September, Kim raised $500,000 from investors in South Korea. His goal is to raise enough to qualify for an American investor visa.

He isn't the only entrepreneur who talks about coming to the United States. "I know for sure that I want one more stint in the States," says Shin. He is curious to find out if he can replicate his success in America's larger, more competitive market; and even though he now speaks passable Korean, he has never stopped thinking of himself as an American. "I don't know when, and it's too early to think about ideas, but I know I'll probably end up going back and forth," he says. "I think it's possible to do stuff in both places."

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Sunday, November 20, 2011

South Korea's Economy: What do you do when you reach the top?





http://www.economist.com/node/21538104

To outsiders, South Korea’s heroic economic ascent is a template for success. But now it has almost caught up with the developed world it must change its approach

It is a crisp autumn morning in Seoul, and a hopeful fisherman sits dreaming by the Cheonggyecheon stream as the world bustles happily by. Glass skyscrapers rise behind him housing the capital’s new financial district. The shopfronts at their base are among the swankiest in Asia. Office workers, families and schoolchildren amble past. Busking fills the air. The water tumbles past plum trees and willows.

Twenty years ago, this background would itself have seemed a dream for anyone foolish enough to be trying to fish the Cheonggyecheon. Its waters, dirty and hidden, were trapped beneath a roaring highway; its surroundings were a slum of sweatshops, metal bashing and poverty. The reclamation of the Cheonggyecheon, one of the great urban-regeneration projects of the world, has about it the air of a dream achieved. So, to a large extent, has the Korea through which the stream flows.

In 1960, in the aftermath of a devastating war, the exhausted south was one of the poorest countries in the world, with an income per head on a par with the poorest parts of Africa. By the end of 2011 it will be richer than the European Union average, with a gross domestic product per person of $31,750, calculated on a basis of purchasing-power parity (PPP), compared with $31,550 for the EU. South Korea is the only country that has so far managed to go from being the recipient of a lot of development aid to being rich within a working life.

For most poor countries, South Korea is a model of growth, a better exemplar than China, which is too vast to copy, and better, too, than Taiwan, Singapore or Hong Kong. All three are richer than Korea but all are, in different ways, exceptions: Singapore and Hong Kong are city states, while Taiwan’s disputed sovereignty makes it sui generis.

South Korea has not merely grown fast. It has combined growth with democracy. Though its spurt began under a military dictator, Park Chung-hee, for the past 25 years the country has had a vibrant parliamentary system. Korea scores the same as Japan in the democracy tally kept by Freedom House, a think-tank in Washington, DC. No other Asian country does as well. At the same time Korea has combined growth with equity. Between 1980 and 1997, its Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, fell from 0.33 to an exceptionally low 0.28, before rising back up during the 1997-98 Asian crisis. In 2010, the level was 0.31, a bit worse than Scandinavian countries, a bit better than Canada.

A model that worked

Now Korea can add resilience to its roster of achievements. It was walloped during the global financial crisis, but recovered faster than any other rich country. Between June 2008 and February 2009, Korea lost 1.2m jobs. South Korea’s relatively open financial system made it vulnerable to the volatility in world markets, a vulnerability that continues. This September, foreigners withdrew over 1.3 trillion won ($1.1 billion) from the stock market and the currency slumped 10%.

Yet in 2010, GDP grew by 6%. This year’s expansion is likely to be 4%. The unemployment rate is now a covetable 3%. Some of the recovery is the result of Korea’s happy dependence on China: it exports more capital goods to China relative to the size of its economy than anyone else, even Germany. But this is only part of the explanation (which is just as well given China’s slowdown). The government also initiated a public-works scheme that is mopping up over 2% of the labour force. It introduced an old-age pension and began, then expanded, an earned-income tax credit. All this from President Lee Myung-bak, who was once chief executive officer of Hyundai Construction and is widely assumed to be excessively friendly to big business.

Korea’s relentless convergence towards America’s standard of living (see chart 1) has barely missed a beat. China’s dollar GDP per person would have to grow at 7.5-8% a year for 20 years to reach the heights Korea has already scaled. If the Korean economy goes on growing at 4.5% a year and America’s at 2.5%, Korea would overtake America (in PPP terms) only a few years later.

To keep growing that impressively, though, Korea will need some new tactics. And it will need to develop them from scratch. When a country or a company is playing catch-up it can look at what others are doing and do it better. This Korea has done well. Hyundai has outcompeted Toyota in the market for reliable, efficient, cheap cars. Korea’s shipyards have beaten everyone through economies of scale.

All change

But this way of doing things works only when others have blazed a trail before you. As you join the ranks of the richest, you run out of beaten track to follow. Your economy comes to depend more on innovation and on learning from your own mistakes than on improving on the successes of others. The South Korean model of 1960-2010 remains an example for developing countries; but Korea itself now needs something new.

The Korean model had four distinctive features: a Stakhanovite workforce; powerful conglomerates; relatively weak smaller firms; and high social cohesion. All these are either coming under strain, or in need of reassessment, or both.

South Koreans lay great store by education and hard work. They put in 2,200 hours of work a year, half as much again as the Dutch or Germans. Their reaction to the 2008 slump was to work harder still. During the 2009-10 recovery, reckons Richard Freeman of Harvard University, Korea had the second-largest increase in hours worked in manufacturing, after Taiwan. And the quality of labour has been even more important than the quantity. Along with Finland and Singapore, Korean schools regularly top international comparisons of educational standards, such as those run by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a rich-country club. Korea spends a larger share of GDP on tertiary education than any rich country other than America. Given relatively low wages, this superbly educated workforce is hard to beat.

But with Korea already top of the league tables, it is harder to generate further jumps in income from big increases in hours and skills. Indeed, the immediate problem is merely to maintain its excellence. According to Yeong Kwan Song of the Korean Development Institute (KDI), a think-tank, companies are starting to worry that graduates are emerging from university with the wrong skills. On some estimates, half of recent graduates are failing to find full-time jobs and are going into further study or part-time employment. So while general education remains good, some industrial skills may be declining.

One way to boost the skilled labour force might be to have rather more people working rather fewer hours. The extra people would be women, often highly educated ones. Quite a lot of Korean women stay at home—the participation rate for women aged 25-54 is only 62%, the fourth-lowest in the OECD—even though they are usually better educated than men. In almost all rich countries, the best-educated women are more likely to work than their less-educated sisters. Not in South Korea.

Shorter hours might encourage some of these skilled women into the workforce. So might a change in attitudes to schooling. The job of supervising a child’s education falls to women, which is one of the reasons why relatively few women have jobs.

This does not mean that they have a lot of children instead. Korea has a fertility rate of 1.2, one of the lowest in the OECD. This is in part because those good educations make having children a pricey proposition. An unusually large part of the spending that makes Korean education so good is private, not public. The government spends just under 5% of GDP on education, slightly below the rich-country average. Families add an extra 2.8% of GDP on top of that, easily the highest rate in the OECD. At universities, family spending is three times that of the state. And families spend an estimated 8% of their household budgets on after-hours programmes for each child, an investment which explains the effort mothers put into making sure it pays off. If you have three children, their after-school activities alone could swallow up a quarter of the household budget.

The power of conglomerates. Much of South Korea’s miracle has been the work of big conglomerates, or chaebol. Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, argues that they are “among the most technologically and commercially progressive agents in the Korean economy”. Samsung Electronics, for instance, one of 83 constituent parts of the Samsung empire, sells more smartphones than Apple. Korea’s shipyards have just started work on a new class of container ships called the triple E-class which are easily the largest container ships ever built (Maersk, the ships’ buyer, says the three Es refer to economy of scale, energy efficiency and environmental cleanliness; simpler just to see them betokening EEEnormity). Korea’s large companies employ slightly less than a quarter of the workforce and produce more than half the country’s output. Chaebol-alikes exist round the world, from Carlos Slim’s Group Carso in Mexico to Lee Ka-shing’s holdings in Hong Kong.

The surviving chaebol have proved resilient. During the 1997-98 crisis, some chaebol’s debt-to-equity ratios soared to over 500%; half of them went bust and conglomerates were widely seen as a drag on the economy. Now, those that came through the time of trial have returned to profitability and respectable debt ratios—but their success still has a downside.

After the founding fathers

The chaebol system has proved prone to fraud, dodgy accounting and illegal political contributions. Many of the companies depend to an unhealthy degree on a founder or his family. About half the managers of Samsung’s firms used to work in the chairman’s secretariat—and thus directly for the founder or his son—and owe their promotion to the associated patronage. As with any family business, the moment of greatest danger is when the leadership passes to the next generation. Samsung passed this test in 1987 when the founder handed over to his son, Lee Kun-hee. Now Mr Lee’s son, Jay Y. Lee, has been appointed chief operating officer of Samsung Electronics and a new transition looms. If Mr Lee the third has business acumen, fine. If not, the whole country could suffer.

Find out how much of an Apple iPhone is actually a Samsung with our "teardown" infographic.Moreover, there are signs that the chaebol may be stifling innovation and entrepreneurship. They have proved expert at applying and improving existing technology, even the high technology of touch-screen smartphones. But except in some internet businesses and computer gaming, South Korea has few start-ups or cutting-edge technology firms. It lacks nationwide venture-capital businesses, says Hasung Jang, the dean of Korea University’s Business School, because each chaebol has one of its own. The firms snap up the best and brightest and turn them into company men. Mr Jang compares the conglomerates to light-hogging trees in a forest: their canopy may be impressive, but it is hard for anything to grow underneath.

Koreans perceive fewer opportunities for entrepreneurship than any of their peers in rich countries except Japan, according to an annual survey by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, set up by the London Business School and Babson College, Massachusetts. As South Korea moves towards the technological frontier, such attitudes will have to change. Innovation is not going to come if everyone shelters from risk in the chaebol.

Weak small firms. There is a huge productivity gap between Korea’s export-oriented chaebol and small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) which dominate services. Value added per worker in small firms is less than half that in large ones. SMEs’ operating profits were 4.5% of sales in 2007, compared with about 7% for large firms. Small firms spend about half as much on research and development as large ones per unit of sales and borrow far more relative to assets. Over time, their performance seems to be getting worse. Korea, in short, has first-world manufacturing exporters and third-world services.

Coddled, not coping

There are several reasons for the mismatch. Small firms are crowded out of markets for people and skills by the chaebol. And because chaebol pay scales often rise according to years in service, they squeeze wage bills by firing older workers, with the service sector working as a recycling system for surplus labour. Small firms have also been coddled by the government. Korea maintains various entry barriers to shelter mom-and-pop stores from competition. Government support to SMEs rose from under 6 trillion won in 2008 to 10 trillion in 2009. Public credit guarantees rose from 33 trillion won in the Asian crisis to almost 60 trillion won in 2009. Last year, the government “requested” banks to roll over their loans to small firms. Randall Jones of the OECD argues that all this help has made SMEs less, not more, efficient, and damaged competitiveness. The richest economies are switching into services that in Korea are dominated by small firms which cannot compete.

Social cohesion. Korea’s equal distribution of income is changing. Judging by the relationship between the richest and poorest tenth, Korea is becoming more unequal than it used to be. Worse, the growing number of poor people is disproportionately elderly. In other rich countries, people between 66 and 75 are no more likely to be poor than the population as a whole. In Korea, they are three times as likely to be poor. This is all the more worrying because the low birth rate means the country is ageing more rapidly than any other rich country. In 2009, people over 65 were outnumbered ten to one by the working-age population. By 2050, there will be seven over-65s for every ten working-age adults. Disproportionate old-age poverty would have a huge impact on the social backing for policies designed to foster growth.


Not to be left behind
Korea’s equitable income distribution used to provide a sense that society as a whole was benefiting from breakneck catch-up. But discontent is rising both about inequality and about the role of the chaebol, producing growing disenchantment with both main political parties. The recent election for mayor of Seoul produced an upset win for a left-wing anti-establishment maverick.

It is proving hard to resist the trend towards inequality because of another basic feature of Korea’s economic model: total tax revenues are just 26% of GDP. Taxes are especially low on labour, a choice designed to boost work and foreign investment. But as a result, social spending is low (11%); public spending on family benefits is exceptionally low (less than a quarter of the rich-country average); and the tax-benefit system is the worst in the OECD at reducing inequality and poverty. Korea’s tax-benefit system reduces poverty by only 18% (compared with what it would have been without the benefits). Sweden’s tax-benefit system cuts its poverty rate by 80%.

Korea, argues Mr Jones, needs to increase taxes and social spending in order to reduce poverty and inequality. One reason it is reluctant to do this is because it is afraid of the impact on jobs. Its changing demography also suggests caution in expanding the social safety net too fast or far, as it will be used ever more over the decades to come.

And then there is the ever-present imponderable: the possible need, at some point, to finance the horrendous costs of reunification with destitute North Korea when that state collapses. That would make the vast expense of unification in Germany pale into insignificance. At some point in the future Korea may need all the room for future fiscal expansion it can get.

A bridge to the future

The problems of the South Korean model should not be allowed to obscure either its achievements or its continuing strengths. True, over the past 40 years annual GDP growth has declined from about 10% to 4-5% (see chart 2). Business investment has halved from over 30% of GDP in the mid-1990s to 17% in 2010—but that is still 50% over the OECD average. Further declines in growth seem likely.

That is not surprising. As Kwanho Shin of Korea University and Dwight Perkins of Harvard show, every country’s growth starts to ebb as its income reaches about $10,000 a year. South Korea has kept going longer than most. If it can increase public spending a little to reduce inequality and poverty, boost its labour supply by encouraging more women to work and avoid compromising its educational standards and penchant for hard work, then it should be well placed to pull ahead of Europeans and catch up with America, too.

South Korea has long been a model for outsiders. President Kennedy’s chief economic adviser, Walt Rostow, wanted to use it as a testing ground for his theories about stages of economic growth. But Koreans do not see themselves as a blank slate, or as a new world power. They stress a long legacy of openness and innovation. Before the wars of the 20th century Korea was a bridge between the more closed worlds of China and Japan. It developed movable metal type two centuries before Gutenberg; its last imperial dynasty benefited from checks and balances more extensive than in its Chinese prototypes. The more Korea brings these qualities of domestic innovation to the fore, the better its chances of blazing a new trail for itself. ◦
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Ahn Cheol-soo: A New Voice Grips South Korea With Plain Talk About Inequality and Justice




http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/world/asia/a-new-voice-grips-south-korea-with-plain-talk-about-inequality-and-justice.html



By CHOE SANG-HUN
SEOUL, South Korea — Two days before Seoul elected a mayor last month, an unassuming man slipped into the campaign headquarters of Park Won-soon, an independent candidate. Amid flashing cameras, the man, Ahn Cheol-soo, a soft-spoken university dean who had earlier been seen as a contender for mayor himself, affirmed his support for Mr. Park, entrusted him with a written statement and then left.

“When we participate in an election, we citizens can become our own masters, principle can defeat irregularity and privilege, and common sense can drive out absurdity,” said Mr. Ahn’s statement, an open appeal to voters that quickly spread by way of Twitter and other social networks. “I’m going to the voting station early in the morning. Please join me.”

It was a pivotal moment in an election whose outcome has rocked South Korea. In a country where resentment of social and economic inequality is on the rise, and where many believe that their government serves the privileged rather than the common good, Mr. Ahn’s words — “participate,” “principle,” “common sense” — propelled younger voters to throw their support overwhelmingly behind Mr. Park, the first independent candidate to win South Korea’s second-most-influential elected office.

Nearly 30 percent of the voters who backed Mr. Park on Oct. 26 did so because of Mr. Ahn, according to an exit poll jointly conducted by YTN, a cable news channel, and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.

Mr. Ahn’s charged comments on themes like inequality, the middle class, the despair of the young and “businesses with a soul and a goal nobler than just making money” are prompting comparisons here with the Occupy Wall Street movement.

Yet, after setting off what stunned politicians called a “tsunami,” Mr. Ahn retreated from public view, declining all requests for interviews. Nevertheless, he remains South Korea’s hottest political star.

His name has attracted those who are disillusioned with the existing political parties. This month, 25 younger lawmakers from President Lee Myung-bak’s governing Grand National Party, responding to the party’s loss in the mayoral race, demanded that the president apologize for “arrogance and disconnectedness.” Recent surveys have found that if the next presidential election were held today and Mr. Ahn were a candidate, he would win.

Politicians have called on him to declare whether he intends to run in the December 2012 presidential election, but he has kept silent. Mr. Park said recently that he did not know whether Mr. Ahn would run, but added, “The fact that he once dreamed of running for Seoul mayor makes it clear that he is disappointed, and in despair, over the country’s politics.”

Although one newspaper columnist has accused him of spreading “the virus of demagoguery,” to his fans he is “Dr. Ahn,” a medical doctor who became an expert on computer viruses and is now ready to turn his healing powers to politics.

“Like Spider-Man, once you have the power, even if you don’t like it, you have to accept the responsibility that comes with it and act accordingly,” Mr. Ahn, a science fiction fan, told the weekly Sisa Journal last year.

The Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon speaks volumes about why many Koreans often react with distrust to initiatives trumpeted by the political and corporate elite, like the contentious free-trade agreement with the United States, and why Mr. Lee, while winning the admiration of President Obama, is often regarded by his own people as out of touch.

“Professor Ahn represents the people’s aspirations for change,” said Kim Hyung-joon, a political scientist at Myongji University.

Champion of change is a new addition to Mr. Ahn’s unusual résumé. When he was a young medical doctor, Mr. Ahn, now 49, worked for seven years in his spare time to develop what became South Korea’s first widely used antivirus software.

In 1995, he quit medicine and founded AhnLab, the country’s most successful software company. When he retired as its chief executive in 2005, he donated millions of dollars’ worth of shares to his employees. (Many South Koreans see a telling contrast between that gesture and the actions of a parade of well-known businessmen who have been caught breaking the law to channel wealth to their children.)

On Nov. 14, Mr. Ahn said he would donate half of his 37.1 percent stake in AhnLab to charity. His donation, worth about $130 million, would be used to help “the children of low-income families whose opportunities are limited because of social and economic inequality,” Mr. Ahn said in a statement.

In June, Mr. Ahn became dean of the Graduate School of Convergence Science and Technology at his alma mater, Seoul National University. After the election, he resigned as director of a research institute when the governing party, citing his political activities, threatened to end government financing for it.

Mr. Ahn’s interviews, and the lectures that until recently he gave on campuses across South Korea, reveal Mr. Ahn to be not only a mentor whose talks have inspired younger Koreans, but a social critic whose pointed criticism of the country’s big businesses has struck a deep chord.

“Bill Gates wouldn’t have become Bill Gates if he were born in South Korea,” Mr. Ahn likes to say, accusing Samsung, LG and other major corporations of creating “zoos” and “a realm of predators and lawlessness” where, he says, they have shackled small entrepreneurs with slaverylike contracts.

He took on a national icon: Lee Kun-hee, the chairman of Samsung, whose elitism, analysts say, epitomizes South Korea’s national strategy of letting big business drive economic growth, in the expectation that society as a whole will benefit. Mr. Lee famously said, “We need talented people who can each create livelihoods for 10,000 people.”

“What he failed to add,” Mr. Ahn said in an interview this year with MBC TV, “is that if someone keeps those 10,000 livelihoods for himself and takes more from others, then he’s no help to society, where all of us must live together.”

Such remarks tap into what is arguably the biggest public grievance in South Korean society — and, potentially, a political tinderbox.

President Lee, a former Hyundai chief executive, campaigned in the 2007 election on what he called his “747” vision: the economy would take off like a Boeing 747, giving South Korea a 7 percent economic growth rate, a $40,000 per capita income and the world’s seventh-largest economy.

The economy did grow, though not spectacularly. And many Koreans complained that the 747 of growth had only the rich on board. While big businesses reaped profits, often achieved in part by moving jobs abroad, smaller businesses that supplied them earned less and less.

Older Koreans grew up believing that young people, if they worked hard, could climb high even if their families were poor; the classic example is President Lee himself. But young Koreans tend to see diminished opportunities in a country where the rich can afford private tutors for their children while others struggle to pay skyrocketing tuition and the poor are shut out altogether. Sociologists have sounded alarms about antiestablishment hatred boiling in cyberspace.

“In a way, the current system is worse than the old military dictators,” said Kim Ou-joon, who produces a weekly podcast that satirizes the government and is downloaded by millions of South Koreans. “The dictators beat students, hurting them physically. Today’s ruling class destroys young people’s self-esteem by threatening their livelihood. It humiliates their soul.”

In August, Mr. Ahn told the newsweekly Chosun that many of the students who seek his advice break down, crying in despair.

“A lack of justice is a serious problem,” he told MBC TV, explaining why the book “Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?” by the Harvard political philosopher Michael J. Sandel became a No. 1 best seller in South Korea. “If we let this problem balloon, the tremendous social pressures can explode.”

Before the Seoul mayoral election, some polls showed Mr. Ahn potentially running far ahead of Mr. Park, but on Sept. 6 he announced that he would not run and would instead back Mr. Park. “The expectations people have had for me are not solely for me,” Mr. Ahn said. “Our society’s wish for change was merely expressed through me.”

If Mr. Park was the great beneficiary of Mr. Ahn’s popularity, the hardest hit has been Park Geun-hye, a leader of the Grand National Party and the daughter of Park Chung-hee, the country’s president from 1963 to 1979. Until Mr. Ahn came along, she polled higher than any other potential candidates in the 2012 election to succeed Mr. Lee, who by law cannot run again.

“She’s suddenly become a symbol of the status quo — old times, old age, old ideas,” said Hahm Sung-deuk, a political scientist at Korea University.

But he questioned whether the halo surrounding Mr. Ahn would survive an actual political contest. “People want a fresh face, and the first face they see is Professor Ahn’s,” Mr. Hahm said. “If Professor Ahn jumps into actual politics, much of the mystique and aurora surrounding him will evaporate, too.”

In an interview with the daily Chosun Ilbo in August, Mr. Ahn’s wife, a university professor with whom he has a daughter, said she saw “little chance” of Mr. Ahn entering politics.

Still, in one of his lectures to students, Mr. Ahn said: “You can’t find out how fast the river is flowing by sitting on the banks and watching. You have to take off your shoes and socks and jump in.” ◦
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Sunday, October 16, 2011

The Big Business of South Korea's Mega-Churches









KOREA has long been a hotbed of religiosity. Before a certain Kim Il Sung began having other ideas, Pyongyang (now the capital of North Korea) used to be known as “The Jerusalem of the East”. And in today’s Seoul, practitioners of traditional shamanism, Buddhism, Christianity and even cults such as the Unification Church (better known in the West as the Moonies), all have plenty of followers.

Many of them also have lots of money (not least because religious institutions are tax-exempt). The Protestant church, in particular, seems to have produced a tribe of flashy, mansion-dwelling pastors. This is partly a result of the character of Korean Protestantism: a common theme, for instance, at the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Seoul is that a poor Christian is not a good Christian. However, it is also a result of the incentives created by the sheer size of some churches. Yoido itself ranks as the largest Christian congregation in the world, with over 1m members. Another, Somang Church, has hundreds of thousands of faithful, including South Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak.

With all these people throwing their spare won into the collection plate, mega-churches have become big businesses. Yoido Full Gospel Church’s founder Cho Yong-gi, who has run the congregation since 1958, has family interests ranging from private universities to newspapers. Members of his church were once asked to pray for higher sales for one of his titles.

A pastor at a Seoul-based church of a mere 60,000 members notes that the likes of Yoido have become “so big, and with assets so huge, that human greed comes into play”. And in late September, following complaints by 29 church elders, prosecutors began investigating Mr Cho over the alleged embezzlement of 23 billion won ($20m) from Yoido’s funds. A documentary aired by MBC, a television station, claims that this money was used to buy property in America. The show also charged that Mr Cho’s wife sold a building constructed with collection money for her own gain. Its buyer was Hansei University—an institution where she also happens to be president. Mr and Mrs Cho deny the allegations.

Yoido Church’s founder is rarely out of the news in South Korea. In March he sparked a storm of criticism by claiming the earthquake and tsunami in Japan was “God’s warning” to a country that follows “idol worship, atheism, and materialism”.

He is also too political for some. When President Lee’s government drew up plans to legislate for Islamic sukuk bonds in South Korea, Mr Cho argued that this would aid “terrorists”, and that the president was forgetting the vital role the Protestant lobby had in electing him. Following concerted efforts by Mr Cho and other South Korean church leaders, the government blinked first, and the plan was dropped.

There are plenty of rank-and-file Christians in South Korea who do not indulge in the cathedralism of the mega-pastors. Many of the underground networks helping North Koreans on the run in China are organised by South Korean Christians. Refugees who reach South Korea are often cared for by church groups, and South Korean church aid-agencies are usually among the first to respond to natural disasters around the world, including the Japanese tsunami in March.

But in a country that thrives on group activities and collective bonding, as well as religion, Seoul is a natural home for mega-churches. The likes of Mr Cho, for all their flaws, provide something that millions of Koreans find irresistible. ◦
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Friday, October 14, 2011

Video: Did Koreans Invent Pizza?


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Monday, October 03, 2011

Samsung: Asia’s new model company





http://www.economist.com/node/21530984

Samsung’s recent success has been extraordinary. But its strategy will be hard to copy
Oct 1st 2011 from the print edition

THE founders of South Korea’s chaebol (conglomerates) were an ambitious bunch. Look at the names they picked for their enterprises: Daewoo (“Great Universe”), Hyundai (“The Modern Era”) and Samsung (“Three Stars”, implying a business that would be huge and eternal). Samsung began as a small noodle business in 1938. Since then it has swelled into a network of 83 companies that account for a staggering 13% of South Korea’s exports. The hottest chilli in the Samsung kimchi bowl is Samsung Electronics, which started out making clunky transistor radios but is now the world’s biggest technology firm, measured by sales. It makes more televisions than any other company, and may soon displace Nokia as the biggest maker of mobile-telephone handsets.

Small wonder others are keen to know the secret of Samsung’s success. China sends emissaries to study what makes the firm tick in the same way that it sends its bureaucrats to learn efficient government from Singapore. To some, Samsung is the harbinger of a new Asian model of capitalism. It ignores the Western conventional wisdom. It sprawls into dozens of unrelated industries, from microchips to insurance. It is family-controlled and hierarchical, prizes market share over profits and has an opaque and confusing ownership structure. Yet it is still prodigiously creative, at least in terms of making incremental improvements to other people’s ideas: only IBM earns more patents in America. Having outstripped the Japanese firms it once mimicked, such as Sony, it is rapidly becoming emerging Asia’s version of General Electric, the American conglomerate so beloved of management gurus.

There is much to admire about Samsung (see article (http://www.economist.com/node/21530976)). It is patient: its managers care more about long-term growth than short-term profits. It is good at motivating its employees. The group thinks strategically: it spots markets that are about to take off and places huge bets on them.

The bets that Samsung Electronics placed on DRAM chips, liquid-crystal display screens and mobile telephones paid off handsomely. In the next decade the group plans to gamble again, investing a whopping $20 billion in five fields in which it is a relative newcomer: solar panels, energy-saving LED lighting, medical devices, biotech drugs and batteries for electric cars. Although these industries seem quite different from each other, Samsung is betting that they have two crucial things in common. They are about to grow rapidly, thanks to new environmental rules (solar power, LED lights and electric cars) or exploding demand in emerging markets (medical devices and drugs). And they would benefit from a splurge of capital that would allow large-scale manufacturing and thus lower costs. By 2020 the Samsung group boldly predicts that it will have sales of $50 billion in these hot new areas, and that Samsung Electronics will have total global sales of $400 billion.

It is easy to see why China might like the chaebol model. South Korea’s industrial titans first prospered in part thanks to their close ties with an authoritarian government (though Samsung was not loved by all the generals). Banks were pressured to pump cheap credit into the chaebol, which were encouraged to enter dozens of new businesses—typically macho ones such as shipbuilding and heavy industry. Ordinary Koreans were chivvied to save, not consume. South Korea grew into an exporting powerhouse. Does this sound familiar?

In China, too, the state draws up long-term plans, funnels cash to industries it deems strategic and works hand-in-glove with national champions, like Huawei and Haier (see article (http://www.economist.com/node/21530974) ). Some of Beijing’s planners would love to think that state intervention is the route to world-beating innovation. No doubt inadvertently, Samsung feeds this delusion.

Of hindsight and survivor bias

For delusion it is, on three levels. Most broadly, South Korea’s prosperity owes less to dirigisme than China’s dirigistes believe, and nothing to dictatorship—South Korea is now a democracy, and much happier for it. Second, the chaebol system has been less beneficial for South Korea than Samsung’s success might imply. Some of the state-directed cheap credit that powered the chaebol produced superb companies, such as Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motors. But it yielded some costly failures, too. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, half of the top 30 chaebol went bust because they had expanded recklessly. Daewoo, the Great Universe, is no more.

Defenders of the chaebol say that the crisis spurred reforms, curbing the tendency of the chaebol to overborrow and overexpand. They don’t hog credit as much as before—Samsung Electronics now generates oceans of cash to finance its expansion plans. But in general the giants still crowd out small entrepreneurial firms: a former boss of Samsung Electronics has warned that South Korea has too many eggs in too few baskets. And despite a decade of political reform, the ties between the chaebol and the state are still too cosy. President Lee Myung-bak (the ex-boss of a Hyundai firm) has pardoned dozens of chaebol bosses convicted of corporate crimes.

Find out how much of an Apple iPhone is actually a Samsung with our "teardown" infographic.As for Samsung, it is an admirable company, packed full of individual successes that managers (and not just ones in Asia) should study. But inevitably it has not always got everything right—who now drives a Samsung car? And its overall success is not easily replicable. Samsung is patient and bold because the family of its late founder, Lee Byung-chull, wants it to be. Family control is guaranteed by a complex web of cross-shareholdings. This is fine so long as the boss is as brilliant as the late Lee or his son, Lee Kun-hee, the current chairman. But if the founder’s grandson, who is being groomed for the top job, fails to measure up, he will be harder for the company’s shareholders to oust than his peers at GE, Sony and Nokia.

To that extent, for all its modern technology, Samsung’s story is an old one writ new—the well-run family firm, with a strong culture and a focus on the long term, which has made good use of an indulgent state. Celebrate it on those grounds and Asia’s new model has something going for it. Just don’t expect it to keep going at its current rate for ever. ◦
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